

Wenqing Liao

# The Application of the Theory of Efficient Breach in Contract Law

A Comparative Law and Economics Perspective

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Maastricht

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCL	Contract Law of the People's Republic of China
CESL	Directive on Common European Sales Law Directive COM (2011) 635 final
CISG	Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods
CPC	Communist Party of People's Republic of China
CPL	Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China
DCFR	Draft Common Frame of Reference of European Private Law
ECL	The Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China
FECL	Law of the People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interest
GPCL	The General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China
NPC	National People's Congress
PCR	People's Republic of China
PECL	Principles of European Contract Law
Prop. CESL	a Proposal for a Regulation for Common European Sales Law
SGA	The Sales of Goods Act 1893
SGA 1979	The Sales of Goods Act 1979
SPC	Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China
TCL	The Law of the People's Republic of China on Technology Contracts
TEC	European Union Treaty Establishing the European Community
TFEU	Treaty on Functioning of the European Union;
UPICC	UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 1994.

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