

REGULATORY COMPETITION IN EUROPEAN CORPORATE  
AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW



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IN EUROPEAN CORPORATE  
AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW

An Empirical Analysis

Lars HORNUF



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*To My Grandfather, Gerhard*



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Lars Hornuf





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