Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal System

An analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union
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Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal System

An analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union

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## CONTENTS

### PART I – INTRODUCTION 1

**Chapter 1**  
**Introduction**  3  
1.1 Interpretation versus application  7  
1.2 Interpretative aids  8  
1.3 Values in judicial argumentation  10  
1.4 Methodology  13  
1.5 Outline  13  

**Chapter 2**  
**Context of legal argumentation in the European Court of Human Rights**  15  
2.1 Character of the European Convention  16  
2.2 ECtHR a constitutional court?  16  
2.3 Style of judgment  20  
2.4 Subsidiarity  22  
2.5 Conclusion  23  

**Chapter 3**  
**Context of legal argumentation in fundamental rights cases for the Court of Justice of the European Union**  25  
3.1 The CJEU and Fundamental Rights  26  
3.2 The CJEU and the ECHR  33  
3.3 Argumentation by the CJEU  35  
3.4 Conclusion  39  

### PART II – THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 41

**Chapter 4**  
**Interpretation methods and interpretative principles**  43  
4.1 Terminology: Method, rule, principle?  44  
4.2 Hierarchy of interpretation methods?  47
Chapter 6

6.1.5 The distinction between internal and external component revisited 122
6.1.6 Criticism of comparative interpretation 123
6.1.6.1 Criticism of the legitimacy of comparative interpretation as a method of interpretation 123
6.1.6.2 Criticism of the use of comparative interpretation 127
6.1.7 Solutions for addressing the criticism 131
6.2 Comparative interpretation and the ECtHR 135
6.3 Comparative interpretation and the CJEU 138
6.4 Conclusion 142

Chapter 7

Principle of evolutive interpretation 145
7.1 Some preliminary remarks on evolutive interpretation 146
7.2 Evolutive interpretation and international law 149
7.3 Evolutive interpretation and national law 154
7.4 European Court of Human Rights 161
7.4.1 Basis and justification for evolutive interpretation 161
7.4.2 Meaning and nature of evolutive interpretation in the context of the Convention 163
7.4.3 How is evolutive interpretation established? 164
7.4.4 When does the ECtHR rely on evolutive interpretation? 166
7.4.5 Evolution upwards? 168
7.4.6 Conclusion 169
7.5 Court of Justice of the European Union 169
7.6 Conclusion 171

Chapter 8

Principle of autonomous interpretation 173
8.1 Autonomous interpretation and international law 174
8.2 European Court of Human Rights 176
8.3 Court of Justice of the European Union 184
8.4 Conclusion 188
10.4.4 Does the ECtHR acknowledge the distinction between internal and external materials? 260
10.4.5 Who collects the materials? 261
10.5 Role of comparative reasoning in relation to other methods and principles 262
10.6 Conclusion 264

Chapter 11
Evolutive interpretation in the case law of the ECtHR 267
11.1 Identification of evolutive interpretation in the case law 268
11.2 Why invoked by the Court? 272
11.3 When does evolutive interpretation play a role? 275
11.4 How does the Court find an ‘evolution’? 281
11.5 Relation to other interpretative aids 285
11.6 Conclusion 287

Chapter 12
Autonomous interpretation in the case law of the ECtHR 289
12.1 What is autonomous interpretation? 290
12.2 Autonomous interpretation: interpretative principle or method? 292
12.3 Why autonomous interpretation? 293
12.4 When autonomous interpretation? 297
12.5 How is autonomous meaning established? 302
12.6 Conclusion 308

Chapter 13
Interpretation in the case law of the CJEU 311
13.1 The CJEU and the interpretation of fundamental rights 314
13.2 Comparative Interpretation 318
  13.2.1 Introduction 318
  13.2.2 Role of national constitutional traditions 320
  13.2.2.1 The basis for invoking national constitutional traditions 322
  13.2.2.2 CJEU and national constitutional traditions 324
  13.2.2.3 Advocate General and national constitutional traditions 331
  13.2.2.4 Comparing approaches 340
  13.2.2.5 The purpose of invoking national constitutional traditions 340
  13.2.2.6 Common Traditions? 344
  13.2.2.7 Material 347
  13.2.2.8 Conclusion 351
  13.2.3 Role of the ECHR 352