The first decennium of merger control under European competition law offers an enticing stimulus for all kinds of evaluations on the Merger Regulation’s running time, in particular into the economic feasibility of its rules and their application. An economic analysis of the Regulation allows for a positive assessment of the envisioned effects, while also enabling normative statements on how to improve the rules’ workability given an umbrella of goals to be achieved. This study was inspired by one of the Merger Regulation’s more controversial issues, as surrounding the taking into account of efficiencies resulting from a merger under scrutiny. Currently hardly featured in the evaluation process, it will be shown that efficiencies carry the potential to move to the centre of stage in those competitively “close” cases, pending prohibition because of the underlying amalgamation’s latent anticompetitive effects, but at the same time characterised by a strong synergistic content.
Comments from Roberto Pardolesi (Luiss Guido Carli, Rome):
“The major strength of the work is the original development of fresh insights in discussing existing literatures, as well as in applying sophisticated economic arguments to the analysis of European discipline of Merger Control … The comparison with the US legal and economic approach to merger regulation is pervasive and efficaciously performed.”
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